In this article it is argued that Popper's well-known deductive and falsificationistic epistemology is historically rooted in German psychology, notably the work of Otto Selz. Drawing on Popper's early and still unpublished psychological manuscripts it is shown how Otto Selz's psychology of thinking with its emphasis on the guiding role of schematic anticipations gave the impetus to Popper's theory of problem solving, his theory of the Searchlight, and its attendant rejection of empiricism, the so-called Bucket theory of knowledge. In the (...) second part of the article it is argued that Selz's theory of schematic anticipations is rooted in Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie. Because Meinong's theory was partly an attempt to do justice to the objectivity of thinking, this may explain why the anti-psychologist Popper felt nevertheless attracted to the psychology of Selz. (shrink)

The idea that we acquire knowledge by trial and error has been one of the truly great ideas of the twentieth century. As no reader of his philosophical and autobiographical work could have failed to notice, Karl Popper credits himself for having invented this idea. The theory of trial and error or, in Popper's words, the Searchlight theory of knowledge and mind, is not just a part of Popper's comprehensive philosophy but rather one of its key features. It is at (...) the bottom of some of his most spectacular achievements in methodology, epistemology, the philosophy of biology, and even political philosophy. Indeed, it is put forward at once as a model for the growth of individual knowledge (both human and animal), the growth of life (Darwin's theory of evolution), and the growth of scientific knowledge (philosophy of science). As happens so often with innovative ideas, the Searchlight theory derives much of its glamour from the theory it rejects: the view of the mind being a tabula rasa and sense perception the origin of all (human) knowledge. Popper nicknames this empiricists' view as the Bucket theory since it conceives of the mind as nothing but the conduit for sense-impressions, an empty bucket to be filled by the accumulation and storage of information. 1 In his hands the Bucket theory collapses under the strain of philosophical arguments and scientific facts and is replaced by a theory which maintains that our knowledge of the physical world is drawn from our mind and constructed from the repertoire of knowledge dispositions we already possess. Acquiring dispositions proceeds according to the method of trial and error elimination. This method, Popper contends, consists essentially of three stages: forming a problem or expectation, trying out a number of solutions of the problem, and eliminating or discarding false solutions as erroneous. 2 A key feature of Popper's theory of trial and error elimination, and the reason for speaking of a Searchlight theory of knowledge and mind, is his insistence that problems or expectations take precedence over observations. Observations are always preceded by expectations, points of view, questions or problems which, as a searchlight, illuminate a certain area, thereby enabling the organism or the scientist to know what to observe in the first place. -/- The question arises how and when did Popper come to this theory of the growth of knowledge and mind which was to have such radical implications for the philosophy of science, epistemology, and the philosophy of psychology? My aim in this article is to trace the roots of his theory of the Searchlight. The earliest traces of the theory are to be found in his unpublished dissertation, Zur Methodenfrage der Cognitive psychology (1928). Here I will focus upon this "hasty last minute affair" written in the tradition of early German cognitive psychology and supervised by one of its most outstanding proponents, Karl Bühler. Scrutiny of this manuscript, however, reveals not so much the formative influence of Bühler as that of Otto Selz. Indeed, I will argue that Popper borrowed his crucially important Searchlight theory from Selz. Thus having found the origin of the key notion of his epistemology in psychology, the relation between psychology and philosophy in Popper's work, always fraught with tension, is up for thorough reconsideration. (shrink)

This paper discusses a neglected theme in Wittgenstein’s writings on meaning and psychology from the early 1930s until 1949. Throughout this period Wittgenstein deals with aspects of meaning of words and pictures that cannot be accounted for in dispositional terms but have to be related to experience and perception. Wittgenstein’s reading of William James, I argue, has sharpened his eye for the many pitfalls in coming to terms with this experiential notion of meaning. James’s treatment of experiences of meaning succumbs (...) to the temptation to postulate “meaning-bodies,” bearers of meaning apart from the way and context in which we use the particular words. I argue that the conflation of what Wittgenstein calls the transitive and intransitive use of words is at the root of postulating meaning-bodies. I also argue that contemporary treatments of experiences of meaning are similarly vulnerable to James’s confusion. (shrink)

This book is about Karl Popper's early writings before he began his career as a philosopher. The purpose of the book is to demonstrate that Popper's philosophy of science, with its emphasis on the method of trial and error, is largely based on the psychology of Otto Selz, whose theory of problem solving and scientific discovery laid the foundation for much of contemporary cognitive psychology. By arguing that Popper's famous defence of the method of falsification as well as his elaboration (...) of an evolutionary theory of knowledge are equally indebted to German psychology, Michel ter Hark challenges the received view of the development of Popper's philosophy. The book concludes with a reinterpretation of Popper's theory of the mind-body problem, emphasizing its contemporary relevance. (shrink)

On the basis of his unpublished thesis ‘Gewohnheit und Gesetzerlebnis in der Erziehung’ a historical reconstruction is given of the genesis of Popper's ideas on induction and demarcation which differs radically from his own account in Unended quest. It is shown not only that he wholeheartedly endorses inductive epistemology and psychology but also that his ‘demarcation’ criterion is inductivistic. Moreover it is shown that his later demarcation thesis arises not from his worries about, on the one hand, Marxism and psychoanalysis (...) and, on the other hand, Einstein's physics, but rather from his urgent preoccupation with providing pedagogy with a psychological foundation, which has its sources in Karl Bühler's cognitive psychology as well as, surprisingly, Adler's Characterology. Aside from Adler some lesser known psychologists, such as Karl Groos, will also be seen to have played a formative role on Popper's early thinking. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on sections iv and v of part II of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. In these sections Wittgenstein deals with two closely knit problems: our knowledge of other minds and the subject matter of psychology. The interpretation of Wittgenstein’s treatment of these problems cannot remain confined to these sections, however, as equally important references to these problems occur elsewhere in the Investigations as well as in the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Moreover, Wittgenstein’s very treatment of the two (...) problems is intertwined with his treatment of some other problems in the philosophy of psychology. For instance, in the context of his discussion of the subject matter of psychology, he points out analogies with problems pertaining to theories of perception. I take these analogies seriously and, therefore, a discussion of perception is interwoven as appropriately. Yet another preliminary remark. Although references to other philosophers and psychologists do not occur in sections iv and v, it does not follow that they were not written in response to others. On the contrary, a substantial part of these (and other) sections is the product of reflecting upon theories produced by Russell, James and Köhler. In my view, the best way to understand Wittgenstein is to involve the standpoints of his adversaries explicitly into the discussion. Otherwise seemingly trivial questions and condensed remarks, gain power and depth when explicitly seen as undermining and reversing dominant theories in philosophy and psychology. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to show that one of Popper's key ideas in epistemology, his so-called theory of the searchlight, is derived from early German Denkpsychologie, in particular the theory of schematic anticipations of Otto Selz. With his theory of schematic anticipations Selz intended to replace various forms of association psychology. Likewise Popper's theory of the searchlight aims to replace empiricism in epistemology (the Bucket theory, as he calls it). On the basis of Popper's still unpublished manuscripts on (...) psychology between 1927 and 1931, it is shown that his position became increasingly Selzian. The term "Bucket theory" is used by him for the first time in an article in which he defends Selz, and in his earlier Ph.D. thesis there occur passages which show him in complete agreement with the theory of schematic anticipations. It is argued that Popper's Selzian stance in psychology finally enabled him to develop his characteristic deductive stance in epistemology and philosophy of science. It is also emphasized that Popper never credits Selz for this formative role. (shrink)

This essay sketches the potential implications of Wittgensteinian thought for conceptualizations of socalled fictive mental states, e.g. mental calculating, imagination, pretend play, as they are currently discussed in developmental psychology and philosophy of mind. In developmental psychology the young child's pretend play and make-belief are seen as a manifestation of the command of an underlying individualistic “theory of mind”. When saying “This banana is a telephone” the child's mind entertains simultaneously two mental representations, a primary or veridical representation about the (...) real properties of banana's and a pretend representation. It is the task of psychology to explain how this “double knowledge” does not result in conceptual chaos. Various sorts of internal mechanisms are postulated. In this essay it is argued that the threat of chaos is misconceived, and that the solutions are irrelevant. Following Wittgenstein's sparse remarks about the secondary sense of words, I argue that pretend language does not refer to underlying individual mental representations but to the child's creative transference of words used in one, primary, domain of application to another, secondary domain. The command and use of the secondary domain logically presupposes the command and use of the primary domain. Since the latter domain is necessarily public and social, fictive mental states cannot be dealt with purely individualistically as current mentalism assumes. (shrink)

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and behaviourism arise?—The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometimes perhaps we shall know more about them—we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. And now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended (...) process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny them. (shrink)

How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and behaviourism arise?—The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometimes perhaps we shall know more about them—we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. And now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended (...) process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny them. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to give both a sustained interpretation of Wittgenstein’s obscure remarks on the experience of meaning of language, synthaesthesia and secondary use and to apply his insights to recent philosophical discussions about synthaesthesia. I argue that synthaesthesia and experience of meaning are conceptually related to aspect-seeing. The concept of aspect-seeing is not reducible to either seeing or imaging but involves a modified notion of experience. Likewise, synthaesthesia involves a modified notion of experience. In particular, the (...) concept of synthaesthesia involves a secondary use of ‘experience’ and hence is intrinsically dependent on the primary use of language. Recent discussions tend to overlook this distinction between the primary and secondary use of language. (shrink)

“Tell me," Wittgenstein once asked a friend, "why do people always say, it was natural for man to assume that the sun went round the earth rather than that the earth was rotating?" His friend replied, "Well, obviously because it just looks as though the Sun is going round the Earth." Wittgenstein replied, "Well, what would it have looked like if it had looked as though the Earth was rotating?” What would it have looked like if we looked at all (...) sciences from the viewpoint of Wittgenstein’s philosophy? Wittgenstein is undoubtedly one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. His complex body of work has been analysed by numerous scholars, from mathematicians and physicists, to philosophers, linguists, and beyond. This volume brings together some of his central perspectives as applied to the modern sciences and studies the influence they may have on the thought processes underlying science and on the world view it engenders. The contributions stem from leading scholars in philosophy, mathematics, physics, economics, psychology and human sciences; all of them have written in an accessible style that demands little specialist knowledge, whilst clearly portraying and discussing the deep issues at hand. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to give both a sustained interpretation of Wittgenstein’s obscure remarks on the experience of meaning of language, synthaesthesia and secondary use and to apply his insights to recent philosophical discussions about synthaesthesia. I argue that synthaesthesia and experience of meaning are conceptually related to aspect-seeing. The concept of aspect-seeing is not reducible to either seeing or imaging but involves a modified notion of experience. Likewise, synthaesthesia involves a modified notion of experience. In particular, the (...) concept of synthaesthesia involves a secondary use of ‘experience’ and hence is intrinsically dependent on the primary use of language. Recent discussions tend to overlook this distinction between the primary and secondary use of language. (shrink)

*I would like to thank Michel ter Hark, Lodi Nauta and James Connelly, for their critical reading of earlier versions of this paper and for their comments. Gilbert Ryle and R. G. Collingwood are no...

The early research of Karl Popper both in psychology and in philosophy of science is described; its basis for his later breakthroughs in the philosophy of science is explained. His debt to Otto Selz’s thought psychology is thereby detailed. Otto Selz’s philosophy of science is then explained, and its conflict with Popper’s early as well as his later views is portrayed. These studies of the conflicting views of Popper’s early views and Selz’s philosophy of science provide the basis for demonstrating (...) the mistakes that Michel ter Hark has made in claiming that the alleged originality of Popper’s views occurred only in the 1970s and are little more than a rehash of Selz’s alleged evolutionary epistemology. (shrink)

Denkpsychologie has been important for the development of psychology as well as of philosophy during the last century. More specifically, cognitive psychology as well as Karl Popper’s evolutionary epistemology were both influenced by Otto Selz’s cognitive psychology. Without doubt, Selz played a role in the development of Popper’s thinking, but Michel ter Hark has not given convincing evidence for Popper’s idea of bold conjectures being influenced by Selz.

This collection of 17 articles offers an overview of the philosophical activities of a group of philosophers (who have been) working at the Groningen University. The meta-methodological assumption which unifies the research of this group, holds that there is a way to do philosophy which is a middle course between abstract normative philosophy of science and descriptive social studies of science. On the one hand it is argued with social studies of science that philosophy should take notice of what scientists (...) actually do. On the other hand, however, it is claimed that philosophy can and should aim to reveal cognitive patterns in the processes and products of scientific and common sense knowledge. Since it is thought that those patterns can function as guidelines in new research and/or in research in other disciplines, philosophy can nevertheless hold on to the normative aim which is characteristic of 'classical' philosophy of science. Compared to this common assumption, there is a diversity of subjects. Some papers deal with general problems of science, knowledge, cognition and argumentation, others with topics relating to foundational problems of particular sciences. Therefore this volume is of interest to philosophers of science, to philosophers of knowledge and argumentation in general, to philosophers of mind, as well as for scientists working in the physical and applied sciences, biology, psychology and economy who are interested in the foundations of their disciplines. After a foreword by Leszek Nowak and a general introduction by the editors, the book is divided into four parts, with special introductions. - I: Conceptual Analysis in Service of Various Research Programmes (Henk Zandvoort, Rein Vos, Rick Looijen, Gerben Stavenga, Renée Dalitz); - II: The Logic of the Evaluation of Arguments, Hypotheses, Default Rules, and Interesting Theorems (Erik Krabbe, Theo Kuipers, Alfons Keupink, Maarten Janssen/Yao-Hua Tan, Bert Hamminga); - III: Three Challenges to the Truth Approximation Programme (Sjoerd Zwart, Hinne Hettema/Theo Kuipers, Roberto Festa); - IV: Explicating Psychological Intuitions (Anne-Ruth Mackor, Jeanne Peijnenburg, Lex Guichard, Michel ter Hark). The Groningen research group was recently qualified, by an official international assessment committee, as one of the best philosophy research groups in the Netherlands. (shrink)

What does it mean to write "This is not a pipe" across a bluntly literal painting of a pipe? René Magritte's famous canvas provides the starting point for a delightful homage by French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault. Much better known for his incisive and mordant explorations of power and social exclusion, Foucault here assumes a more playful stance. By exploring the nuances and ambiguities of Magritte's visual critique of language, he finds the painter less removed than previously thought (...) from the pioneers of modern abstraction. (shrink)

No artigo "Einstein y el efecto Compton", publicado neste número de SCIENTIÆ UDIA: , os autores estranham o fato de Einstein não ter declarado mais claramente o quanto esse efeito comprovava definitivamente o carácter corpuscular da radiação. A presente nota crítica pretende fornecer elementos adicionais de apreciação que permitam acompanhar o método de exploração do domínio dos quanta elaborado por Einstein, na ausência de uma teoria adequada, e praticado por ele de 1905 à 1925, evidenciando por esse meio propriedades inéditas (...) e inusuais dos fenômenos quânticos; e também explicitar o alvo que ele queria almejar com sua investigação e entender melhor seu pensamento acerca dos quanta. Três argumentos principais são delineados. (1) O problema dos quanta de luz está estreitamente ligado com aquele das propriedades quânticas da matéria atômica em geral, do qual não pode ser separado. (2) Outro experimento, realizado pouco depois do experimento de Compton, trouxe um elemento adicional, necessário para que se possa atribuir sem nenhuma reticiência uma quantidade de movimento à radiação, isto é, o caráter individual da interação da qual a radiação toma parte. (3) Enfim, os trabalhos de Einstein sobre a estatística quântica, realizados no mesmo período, apontavam na direção da generalização do duplo caráter onda-corpúsculo à radiação, como também à matéria, evidenciando a indiscernibilidade dos estados idênticos e revelando, assim, propriedades fundamentais radicalmente novas que toda teoria quântica futura haveria de incluir. In the article "Einstein y el efecto Compton", published in this issue of SCIENTIÆ UDIA: , the authors wonder why Einstein did not claim unambiguously that this phenomenon was a clear and definitive proof of the corpuscular character of radiation. The aims of the present critical note are to provide additional comments that serve to clarify the method that Einstein used for exploring the quantum domain, in the absence of a satisfactory theory - a method he practiced from 1905 to 1925, and from which he obtained evidence of new and unusual properties of quantum phenomena; and to try to formulate what he wanted to get at in his investigations, so as to understand better his thinking about quanta. Three main arguments are sketched. (1) The problem of light quanta cannot be separated from that of the quantum properties of atomic matter in general. (2) Another experiment, performed shortly after Compton's yielded a further element that was necessary to obtain a definitive answer to the question of whether a quantity of motion can be attributed to radiation. (3) Finally, Einstein's works on quantum statistics during that period pointed towards a generalization of the double wave-corpuscle behavior of radiation, and also of matter, providing evidence for the indistinguishability of identical states, thus revealing radically new fundamental properties that should be accounted for by any further quantum theory. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce que comprendre? Comment interpréter une œuvre d'art? Peut-on déchiffrer la nature? Comment s'orienter dans l'espace? Autant de questions que le spécialiste comme le grand public ne manquent pas de se poser et auxquelles Johann Michel tente d'apporter des lumières nouvelles. Longtemps cantonnée à un champ restreint de disciplines tendues vers la compréhension des discours, l'herméneutique a connu un mouvement d'extension sans précédent, sous l'impulsion de Heidegger, Gadamer et Ricœur. Elle quitte alors le refuge de l'érudition pour devenir un (...) nouveau champ d'exploration philosophique centré désormais sur la vie de l'esprit, sur les modes d'existence et sur les traditions. Tout en poursuivant cet élargissement, cet ouvrage propose en même temps un renouvellement en profondeur de l'herméneutique à la faveur d'un dialogue serré avec la sémiotique, le pragmatisme et les sciences sociales. Dans cette perspective, trois idées directrices parcourent l'ensemble de ces études. La première, anthropologique, fait de l'interprétation une activité fondamentale de l'humain dans ses activités ordinaires, avant d'en faire un ensemble de techniques au service de la connaissance scientifique. La seconde, pragmatiste, réserve l'interprétation à une compréhension réflexive confrontée à des significations problématiques. La troisième, épistémologique, étend le domaine d'investigation de l'herméneutique au-delà du texte (la nature, autrui, l'espace, l'œuvre d'art, le monde social...)"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Michel de Montaigne, the inventor of the essay, has always been acknowledged as a great literary figure but has never been thought of as a philosophical original. This book treats Montaigne as a serious thinker in his own right, taking as its point of departure Montaigne's description of himself as 'an unpremeditated and accidental philosopher'. Whereas previous commentators have treated Montaigne's Essays as embodying a scepticism harking back to classical sources, Ann Hartle offers an account that reveals Montaigne's thought (...) to be dialectical, transforming sceptical doubt into wonder at the most familiar aspects of life. This major reassessment of a much admired but also much underestimated thinker will interest a wide range of historians of philosophy as well as scholars in comparative literature, French studies and the history of ideas. (shrink)

A referência central do presente artigo é a fenomenologia material da vida de Michel Henry (1922-2002), fenomenologia essa mediante a qual se evidencia o quanto Karl Marx (1818-1893) merece ser reconhecido como o pensador de uma subjectividade radical em processo de realização mediante uma praxis imanente dos indivíduos, anterior a toda a abstracção política, económica ou institucional Assim, para o autor do artigo, a aplicação desta fenomenologia à economia mostra até que ponto esta última, com as suas equivalências de (...) mercado e capital, não constitui nem uma realidade nem uma teoria autónomas. Por outro lado, o artigo salienta também a enorme importância que para as nossas vidas reais e concretas pode e deve ter uma verdadeira meta-genealogia do processo real da produção e do consumo, especialmente no contexto de uma mundialização cada vez mais objectivista, baseada na aliança entre a ciência e a técnica. Com efeito, o perigo da alienação não é permanente apenas no contexto de uma tal evolução, pois, segundo Michel Henry, o cienti-fismo moderno, ao evacuar a vida subjectiva dos indivíduos, constitui também meio propício para o desenvolvimento de um fascismo latente baseado na negação "metafísica" da individualidade, assim como na "morte" associada às abstracções vazias de uma economia que facilmente se dispensa do "factor humano" ao nível de uma racionalização metodológica sem limite. The central matter of this paper is the material phenomenology of life of Michel Henry (1922-2002), a phenomenology through which it becomes evident how much Karl Marx (1818-1893) deserves to be recognised as the thinker of a radical subjectivity in the process of realization through an immanent praxis of the individuals, prior to all political, economic or institutional abstraction. Therefore, to the paper's author, the application of this phenomenology to economics shows the measure in which the later, with its equivalences of market and capital, neither constitutes an autonomous reality nor an autonomous theory. On the other hand, the paper also underlines the enormous importance which, to our real and concrete lives, a true meta-genealogy of the real process of production and consumption can and should have, especially in the context of a more and more objectivistic globalization, based on the alliance between science and technology. Indeed, the danger of alienation is not only permanent in the context of such an evolution, then, according to Michel Henry, modern scientism, as much as it tends to empty the subjective life of the individuals, is also a propitious means to the development of a latent fascism based on the negation of the "metaphysics" of individuality and, also, on the "death" associated to the empty abstractions of an economics which easily discards the "human factor" at the level of a methodological rationalization without limit. (shrink)

Gutenbergs tryckteknik ledde till en medierevolution som förändrades Europa. I 1500-talets början spreds litteratur, grafik och vetenskap, men också nyhetsblad om katastrofer, pamfletter om invaderande turkar och religiösa stridsskrifter. Medan mycket ännu vägde blommade renässanshumanismen genom Erasmus av Rotterdam. Han stod bakom en femtedel av Europas böcker, och skulle ge framtiden ett viktigt arv. Nina Burton skriver om Erasmus och hans tid så att man känner sig vara med när han träffar konstnärerna och de intellektuella? Albrecht Dürer, Holbein d.y., Paracelsus, (...) Thomas More och Luther? lika väl som påvar, kejsare, pedagoger och rebeller. Genom honom möter man en hel epok. Vilken var Erasmus hemlighet? I sina brev klottrade han självporträtt med dubbla ansikten, och hans förmåga att se två sidor födde ett samtal bortom all fanatism? en dröm om ett gränslöst Europa, där kultur och vetenskap knöt nya samband. Men då religiösa strider började skaka världen fick han mäktiga fiender. Erasmus visade vilken roll litteraturen kan spela i en dramatisk tid som har många likheter med vår egen. (shrink)

Michel Onfray já é um conhecido do público brasileiro pela tradução de alguns de seus livros como A arte de ter prazer, A razão gulosa, O ventre dos filósofos, A políica do rebelde e A escultura de si. Igualmente conhecida é sua postura como filósofo, isto é, sua recusa da academia, sua ênfase no prazer, sua afirmação do ateísmo e sua participação na montagem da Universidade Popular de Caen que pretende, no interior da França (e também nas páginas da (...) web), filosofar com todos os interessados, sem se prender a ela como uma disciplina acadêmica, curricular ou profissional. (shrink)

The Care of the Self is the third and possibly final volume of Michel Foucault’s widely acclaimed examination of "the experience of sexuality in Western society." Foucault takes us into the first two centuries of our own era, into the Golden Age of Rome, to reveal a subtle but decisive break from the classical Greek vision of sexual pleasure. He skillfully explores the whole corpus of moral reflection among philosophers and physicians of the era, and uncovers an increasing mistrust (...) of pleasure and growing anxiety over sexual activity and its consequences. (shrink)

Michel Serres is one of the most influential living theorists in European philosophy. This volume makes available a work which has a foundational place in the development of chaos theory, representing a tour de force application of the principles underlying Serres' distinctive philosophy of science.